R v Shah [2026] EWCA Crim 1073
Sunil Shah’s appeal against a 7 years 6 months sentence for s.18 GBH with intent was dismissed. CCTV showed he deliberately drove his car at the victim, crushing him and causing severe, lasting injuries. The Court rejected arguments about excessive self‑defence, double counting, or mis‑categorisation. The sentencing judge was entitled to treat the car as a highly dangerous weapon, apply aggravating factors (public location, child present, attempt to flee, seriousness of harm). The sentence imposed was not excessive. Disqualification from driving for 6 years upheld.
R v Jugessur [2026] EWCA Crim 1010
Jugessur appealed his 40‑month sentence for multiple offences including dangerous driving, two vehicle thefts, handling stolen goods, criminal damage, and driving while disqualified/uninsured. The Court of Appeal found the Recorder’s sentencing exercise seriously flawed—he failed to apply guidelines, explain plea discounts, or address totality.
The Court re‑did the sentencing, quashing several terms and adjusting others. The final total sentence was reduced to 38 months, with a 3‑year driving disqualification properly structured under ss.35A–35B RTOA.
R v Sharples [2026] EWCA Crim 985
Sharples was convicted of dangerous driving after a police pursuit in which he drove an Audi SQ5 at over 150 mph, making highly dangerous manoeuvres on the M55. He received six months’ immediate imprisonment and a two‑year, two‑month driving disqualification.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Recorder failed to apply section 277A of the Sentencing Act 2026, for which there is a presumption of suspension for sentences of 12 months or less unless exceptional circumstances exist. The court found no exceptional circumstances: although the driving was very dangerous, no collision or injury occurred, and Sharples had strong personal mitigation (rehabilitation from addiction, stable employment, positive character evidence).
The court therefore quashed the immediate custody and imposed six months’ imprisonment suspended for two years. The driving disqualification was reduced to two years, with an extended test.
R v Scott [2026] EWCA Crim 967
Scott pleaded guilty to causing serious injury by dangerous driving and inflicting GBH after deliberately mounting the pavement in a Nissan Qashqai and driving at two pedestrians, seriously injuring one and then fleeing the scene. She received 32 months’ imprisonment and a 10‑year driving disqualification (and extended test).
She appealed the length of the disqualification. The Court of Appeal accepted that although her driving record was previously good, she had used the car as a weapon, caused grave injury, and was assessed as posing a high risk of serious harm when driving while emotionally unstable and misusing drugs. A lengthy ban was justified, but 10 years was manifestly excessive.
The Court reduced the disqualification to 5 years (plus the 16‑month extension), with the extended test requirement remaining.
R (Ambrose) v Chester Magistrates’ Court [2026] EWHC 1728 (Admin)
Ambrose sought judicial review of a District Judge’s decision refusing to find special reasons to avoid mandatory disqualification for a drink‑drive offence. He had blown 42µg, just above the prosecution threshold of 40µg, and proved that his drink had been spiked with tequila without his knowledge. Expert evidence (accepted by the CPS) showed that without the spiking his reading would have been 36µg, below the threshold at which prosecutions are normally brought.
The District Judge applied Delaroy‑Hall (1969) and Pugsley v Hunter (1973), concluding that because A would still have been slightly over the legal limit even without the spiking, special reasons could not be found. Mrs Justice Hill held this was a legal error, because the correct authority was R v Cambridge Magistrates’ Court, ex p Wong (1992), which established that in breath‑test cases special reasons can exist where the excess over the prosecution threshold is caused by the spiking.
The High Court quashed the decision and remitted the case to a freshly constituted bench to reconsider special reasons based on the preserved findings: the drink was spiked, A did not know, and without the spiking he would not have been prosecuted.
R v Ledgeway [2026] EWCA Crim 956
The Court of Appeal quashed a four‑month suspended sentence for causing serious injury by careless driving. The appellant misjudged an overtake in darkness and collided with a motorcycle whose dim but legally compliant headlight made it unusually hard to see. Expert evidence showed the light would only have been recognisable 1–2 seconds before impact.
Although harm was catastrophic, the Court held culpability was at the bottom of Category B1, with powerful mitigation: exemplary character, immediate remorse, appropriate reaction at the scene, and three‑year prosecutorial delay. Community order requirements were unsuitable, but that did not justify custody. Applying the Imposition Guideline, the Court replaced the suspended sentence with a £3,000 Band F fine and left the disqualification intact. The judgment was referred to DVSA due to concerns about outdated motorcycle headlight standards.
R v Jamal and others [2026] EWCA Crim 951
Three defendants were convicted of manslaughter following a fatal high‑speed pursuit on the A46 appealed their convictions. They had been part of a group who lured Saqib Hussain to a Tesco car park intending to assault him over a blackmail dispute. When Hussain realised the set‑up and fled in a Skoda driven by his friend, the group pursued in two cars (a Seat and an Audi). The Seat rammed the Skoda, causing a crash that killed both occupants.
The appeal centred on whether the route to verdict for unlawful act manslaughter was legally flawed—specifically, that the judge failed to identify the required “base offence” and wrongly allowed conviction on the basis of exposing the victims to an “obvious risk of harm” rather than intentional assistance or encouragement of the unlawful act.
The Court of Appeal held that, although the directions could have been more precisely framed, the jury had been properly directed overall: they were required to find participation in a joint plan to inflict unlawful violence, foreseeability of the fatal crash, and intent to cause at least some harm. The convictions were therefore safe.
R v Bukhari [2026] EWCA Crim 929
Ansreen Bukhari applied—780 days out of time—for permission to appeal her minimum term of 26 years 9 months for the murders of Saqib Hussain and Hashim Ijazuddin. The Court of Appeal refused both the extension of time and leave to appeal.
The murders arose from a planned pursuit on the A46 in February 2022, after Bukhari’s former lover Saqib had been blackmailing her. Two cars, including one carrying Bukhari, chased the victims’ Skoda; the Seat Leon rammed it, causing a fatal crash. The trial judge found Bukhari’s planning role was less significant than others, but she was the “grown‑up adult” who repeatedly failed to stop events escalating.
Her daughter Mahek’s minimum term had previously been reduced on appeal due to youth and immaturity, but the Court held this factor did not apply to Ansreen, who was 45 at the time. The Court rejected arguments that the trial judge undervalued mitigation or applied improper upward pressure to her sentence. It concluded her minimum term properly reflected her culpability.
Application dismissed.
R (Worsley) v Tameside Magistrates’ Court [2026] EWHC 1789 (Admin)
The High Court quashed a conviction for failing to provide a blood specimen after the magistrates’ bench prematurely announced a guilty verdict before hearing closing submissions. Mrs Justice Hill held that this breached the defendant’s long‑established right to make a closing speech (CrimPR 24.3(3)(i)) and created, in the words of the judgment, a situation where “a fair‑minded and informed observer… would… have found it difficult to see how the magistrates could have continued to keep an open mind.” The premature verdict amounted to a serious procedural irregularity, rendering the proceedings unfair.
The court also found the refusal to state a case unlawful because it was made by a trainee legal adviser rather than the magistrates themselves, contrary to MCA 1980 s.111, and because the reasons given (“frivolous”) were legally unsound. The alternative ground—challenging the magistrates’ refusal to exclude MGDD/C evidence under PACE s.78—was rejected, as the threshold for irrationality was not met. The conviction was quashed, and the matter remitted for retrial before a district judge.
R v Tamoev [2026] EWCA Crim 896
The applicant pleaded guilty to causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving after failing to give way at a junction despite multiple clear warning signs, colliding with the victim’s vehicle and causing grave, life‑changing injuries including splenic damage, pelvic fractures, arterial dissection and long‑term vertigo and tinnitus. Sentenced to 10 months’ immediate custody and 2 years 5 months’ disqualification, the judge placed the offence in culpability A / harm 1, but wrongly increased the sentence above the guideline starting point, thereby double‑counting aggravating features already reflected in the categorisation. The Court of Appeal held that good character warranted a reduction from the 12‑month starting point, producing a sentence of 6 months after credit. Although all factors favouring suspension were present, the seriousness of the driving and the injuries meant that immediate custody remained justified. Appeal allowed; 6 months’ immediate imprisonment substituted and disqualification adjusted to 18 months in accordance with statutory extension rules.
R v Roberts [2026] EWCA Crim 751
Police response driver convicted of causing death by dangerous driving and causing serious injury by dangerous driving after failing to slow sufficiently when proceeding through a red light en route to a grade‑1 emergency. The Crown Court imposed 27 months’ immediate custody and a 5‑year 1‑month driving disqualification, but the Court of Appeal held the sentence was wrong in principle and manifestly excessive. The sentencing judge had relied on a factually incorrect inference that the appellant deliberately ignored his training, and had failed to give adequate weight to exceptional mitigation, including exemplary service, genuine emergency response, PTSD, caring responsibilities for a disabled daughter, and the victims’ family’s plea for leniency. The Court substituted a sentence at the bottom of the guideline range—24 months’ imprisonment suspended for 18 months, with a concurrent 12‑month suspended sentence for the serious injury count—and corrected the disqualification to the mandatory 5‑year period.
R v Morgan [2026] EWCA Crim 886
The Court of Appeal allowed Corey Morgan’s appeal against an immediate custodial sentence for dangerous driving. Morgan, aged 21 at conviction, had pleaded guilty and received eight months’ imprisonment and a 22‑month disqualification. Because his conviction occurred after 22 March 2026, the newly‑enacted section 277A Sentencing Act 2020 applied. That provision requires a suspended sentence where the offender is over 21, the custodial term is 12 months or less, and no statutory exemption applies, unless the judge finds exceptional circumstances justifying immediate custody.
The Recorder failed to consider section 277A at all and made no finding of exceptional circumstances, despite imposing a sentence below 12 months. The Court held that seriousness alone cannot constitute an exceptional circumstance, and nothing about the case was exceptional. The Recorder was therefore required to suspend the sentence. The Court substituted a two‑year suspended sentence order, with 15 Rehabilitation Activity Requirement sessions, and removed the four‑month extension to the driving disqualification.
R v Lindsay [2026] EWCA Crim 692
The Court of Appeal has confirmed that post‑sentence changes to release regimes (SDS40, HDC) cannot retrospectively render a driving disqualification manifestly excessive. Sentencing judges must apply ss35A–35B RTOA 1988 based on the law and release framework as it exists at the time of sentence, and the Court of Appeal will not re‑sentence simply because the offender is later released earlier than anticipated.
There is no discretion to reduce the extension period under s.35A RTOA 1988. If a sentencing judge wishes to reduce the disqualification period to take into account the early release provisions or apply credit for time spent ‘on remand’ then the sentencing judge may reduce the discretionary period of the disqualification order but not the extension period.
R v Santos [2026] EWCA Crim 676
The Court of Appeal partly allowed Santos’ appeal against sentence. Santos, aged 28, had received a total of 20 months’ imprisonment for a series of drug‑driving offences and a serious incident of dangerous driving involving a prolonged police pursuit at speeds exceeding 100 mph. His appeal challenged both the length and the refusal to suspend the sentence.
The Court held that the Recorder erred in principle by selecting a notional pre‑plea sentence of 30 months for dangerous driving, which unlawfully exceeded the statutory maximum of two years. However, the overall sentence of 20 months was justified given the repeated, escalating, and highly dangerous offending. The Court re‑structured the sentence: dangerous driving reduced to 16 months, ordered consecutive to an increased 4‑month term for one drug‑driving offence, preserving the total of 20 months.
On suspension, although the Recorder’s reasoning was cursory, the Court concluded that the seriousness and persistence of the offending outweighed rehabilitation prospects. Immediate custody was required. The driving disqualification was adjusted to 46 months to reflect the re‑structured sentence.
R v OFM [2026] EWCA Crim 599
The Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal under s.58 Criminal Justice Act 2003 against a ruling of no case to answer. The respondent, OFM, had started a car’s ignition while standing outside the vehicle; the car, left in gear with the handbrake insufficiently applied, moved forward and fatally struck a six‑month‑old child. The trial judge held there was no evidence on which a jury could find that OFM was “driving” for the purposes of causing death by dangerous or careless driving.
The Court of Appeal held that the judge applied too narrow a test. Starting the engine is ordinarily an act of driving, and although OFM did not intend the car to move, intention is relevant but not decisive. A jury could properly conclude that by operating the ignition—one of the principal driving controls—and thereby causing the vehicle to move, OFM was “in a substantial sense controlling the movement and direction of the car” within the meaning of Ames and MacDonagh, and that the act fell within the ordinary meaning of “driving”.
The ruling of no case to answer was therefore wrong in law. The appeal was allowed and the case ordered to proceed to trial.
R v Courtney [2026] EWCA Crim 525
Courtney, aged 22, pleaded guilty to causing serious injury by dangerous driving on the A52 near Nottingham. He joined unlawful street racing, driving at least 80 mph in a 70‑mph limit, lost control, and hit the car in front. The front‑seat passenger suffered a fractured collarbone, needing surgery and leaving lasting pain and a permanent scar; the driver had lesser injuries.
He received 18 months’ immediate custody and a 2‑year driving ban plus 9‑month extension. On appeal he argued the sentence should have been suspended and that culpability was overstated. The Court of Appeal held the judge was right to treat the case as Category A (racing/competitive driving), found the 18‑month term not manifestly excessive, and confirmed that racing on public roads will ordinarily require immediate custody. The appeal was dismissed and the disqualification left unchanged.
Ozkara (Huseyin) [2026] EWCA Crim 479
Ozkara fled the UK for 25 years after causing two deaths by dangerous driving in 1999. When extradited in 2024, he received 12 years plus 8 months for failing to surrender.
Under s.146 Extradition Act 2003, the UK may only deal with offences for which the extraditing state has given consent. France had not consented to prosecution for failing to surrender. The conviction and 8‑month sentence were therefore quashed.
The Court held the judge had wrongly treated the driving as Category A. There was no evidence of a deliberate or obviously dangerous manoeuvre of the kind required for Category A. The correct categorisation was Category B, with a lower starting point.
Because the offences were committed in 1999, the applicable statutory maximum was 14 years. Adjusting the current guideline to that lower cap, the Court concluded that the proper sentence was 8 years’ imprisonment, concurrent on both counts.
The extended disqualification imposed by the Crown Court was not legally available for offences committed before 13 April 2015. The extension was removed, but the ordinary 7‑year ban and extended retest requirement remained.
R v Donaldson [2026] EWCA Crim 441
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction for dangerous driving, ruling that adding a dangerous driving charge after his guilty plea to careless driving — but before sentence — was not an abuse of process.
The Elrington / Beedie principles only bites once the first proceedings have been finally concluded. A guilty plea without sentence does not trigger the bar on escalating charges. The Court held that the decision in Canatar (2025) was intensely fact sensitive and Canatar did not purport to and did not lay down a rule that it is an abuse of process for additional charges to be brought after a person has pleaded guilty to a lesser charge in the Magistrates’ Court.
R v Garwell [2026] EWCA Crim 437
Garwell attempted to overtake three vehicles in pitch darkness on a single‑carriageway 60‑mph road while travelling at 76–88 mph. He collided head‑on with a motorcyclist, killing him instantly. The Crown Court treated the case as Category B, imposed a 3 years 6 months sentence, and applied substantial mitigation for remorse, good character, ASD, and vulnerability in custody.
The Court of Appeal held the judge had miscategorised the offence: the driving involved multiple Category A factors — a deliberate decision to overtake without visibility, an obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre, and speed far above the limit. The correct starting point was 12 years, reducible to 9 years for mitigation, then to 6 years after guilty plea.
The original sentence was therefore unduly lenient. The Court substituted 6 years’ imprisonment and recalculated the driving disqualification to 8 years (5 years + 3‑year extension).
R v Aaran Donnelly [2026] EWCA Crim 201
Donnelly, aged 29, drove at grossly excessive speed (witnesses estimated 50–80 mph in a 30 zone) on a suburban road shortly after ingesting nitrous oxide, lost control, and crashed, killing his friend Ryan Evans, who was a rear‑seat passenger. Two other passengers were injured.
He pleaded guilty to causing death by dangerous driving. The Crown Court treated the case as culpability A, set a 12‑year starting point, uplifted for aggravation (risk to other passengers; nitrous oxide use), then reduced to 9 years for substantial personal mitigation (good character, remorse, impact of killing a friend), and finally applied 25% plea credit, producing a sentence of 6 years 9 months plus 8 years 4 months’ disqualification.
The Attorney General argued the sentence was unduly lenient; Donnelly argued it was manifestly excessive. The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments. It held the culpability A categorisation was plainly correct, the judge’s mitigation reduction—though generous—was within the permissible range, and the final sentence was “merciful” but not wrong.
R v Navid [2026] EWCA Crim 163
Navid drove almost double the speed limit (56–58 mph in a 30 zone) in dark, wet, urban conditions, uninsured, and struck a pedestrian who was standing in the carriageway. He failed to stop, ran a red light, and then tried to fabricate backdated insurance and misled police before eventually returning.
He pleaded guilty to causing death by careless driving and causing death while uninsured. The Crown Court imposed 26 months’ imprisonment.
The Court of Appeal held the judge had over‑weighted aggravation and set too high a notional starting point. Rebalancing the guideline factors and personal mitigation, the Court reduced the sentence to 22 months, still immediate custody, and recalculated the driving disqualification to 2 years plus an 11‑month extension
R v Micura [2025] EWCA 2798 (Admin)
Appeal by the DPP against acquittal for failing to provide driver information under s.172(3). At the offence date the respondent was not the keeper; his mother‑in‑law was. He later became registered keeper and returned the s.172 form denying he was the driver but failed to complete Section C with details of the previous keeper, despite the form expressly requiring it.
Held: Magistrates erred in law.
(1) s.172(4) (reasonable diligence) applies only to the keeper at the time of the offence; respondent was not that person.
(2) As a non‑keeper under s.172(2)(b), he was obliged to give any information in his power, including naming the previous keeper.
(3) Failure to provide that information constituted the offence.
Acquittal set aside; conviction directed.
R v Ali [2025] EWCA Crim 870
The Court of Appeal found the original 4‑year sentence for causing death and serious injury by dangerous driving to be unduly lenient. Ali, aged 18, drove at over 60 mph in a 30 zone, crashed, killing one passenger and seriously injuring another. After the crash he committed multiple further driving offences, which the court said eliminated any claim to remorse.
The offence was placed firmly in Category A due to extreme speed. After recalculating aggravation, mitigation, and guilty plea credit, the Court substituted a sentence of 76 months’ detention and increased the driving disqualification to 8 years 2 months.